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The purpose of this article is to offer further evidence in support of the view that the 
combat performance of the Anglo-Canadian 
armies in Normandy has been greatly underrated 
and the effectiveness of the German forces vastly 
overrated. This argument informs my study of 
the Canadians in Normandy, published under 
the title Fields of Fire,1 but the intention here 
is to consider questions about combat between 
British and German units in Normandy.
My views on this subject were influenced by my 
long association with the late Robert Vogel and 
the work we shared in researching and writing 
a basic narrative of the campaign in Northwest 
Europe published in the 1980s. When we began 
our decade long project, I had little knowledge 
of military history. Vogel, who was a military 
historian, introduced me to Clauswitz and 
other theoreticians but I soon decided that a 
social historian escaping a world dominated 
by Marxists was entitled to be suspicious of yet 
another 19th century authority figure.
We agreed that history at the battalion, brigade 
and divisional level might best be understood 
by a careful reading of the primary sources 
and my first visits to Normandy convinced me 
that one of the most neglected sources was the 
actual ground, especially when supplemented 
by 1944 maps and air photos.2 The study of 
the Normandy battlefields suggested to me that 
the basic question to answer was how the Allied 
soldiers overcame a powerful enemy, defending 
ground of its own choosing, in just 76 days. 
Other historians had answered the question by 
referring to the decisive role of air power and the 
application of brute force to the battlefield but 
few of them seemed to know very much about 
what actually happened at the operational and 
tactical levels.
When our five-volume narrative was complete 
I began to work on three separate but related 
subjects: a study of a single infantry brigade, an 
inquiry into battle exhaustion and an analysis of 
the role played by tactical air power in Normandy. 
The later project led to an interest in operational 
research in both the air force and army and I was 
able to interview a number of the most important 
OR specialists.3
By the mid 1990s, I was convinced that the Allied 
campaign in Normandy required re-examination. 
It was evident that air power, strategic or tactical, 
had not been the decisive factor in Normandy or 
elsewhere. Evidence from operational research 
had also demonstrated that the anecdotal 
evidence on the vulnerability of Allied armour 
and the limited effectiveness of Allied tank 
gunnery was all too true. It was equally apparent 
that the principal Allied weapon systems, 
field and medium artillery, were rarely able to 
inflict damage on prepared enemy positions 
and were not always able to achieve temporary 
neutralization.4
These severe limitations in Allied weapons 
technology helped to explain why the battle of 
Normandy produced so many physical and 
mental casualties but brought us no closer to 
understanding why the enemy was so quickly 
defeated. The Overlord planners prepared for 
a campaign that would proceed in a series of 
managed phases. After the invading troops 
were ashore they were to establish and defend 
a bridgehead, defeating the German counter-
attacks with naval, air, and artillery fire. The 
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bridgehead was, if possible, to include the city of 
Caen, the centre of the road and rail network in 
Normandy. If Caen could not be captured before 
German reinforcements arrived, the city was to 
be masked until the build-up of Allied forces was 
sufficient for a set-piece attack. 
South of Caen, the country was open, with good 
roads leading to the Seine River and Paris. The 
planners assumed that the enemy would defend 
this area in strength, as a breakthrough here 
would cut off German forces in the west and bring 
a quick conclusion to the Battle of Normandy. 
If the enemy behaved rationally, there would be 
a fighting withdrawal to a new defensive line at 
the Seine, with the ground south of Caen sector 
held as a pivot. 
The Overlord plan called for the American army 
to capture Cherbourg and then fight its way 
south, turning west into Brittany to capture Brest 
and create a new port at Quiberon Bay. With the 
Brittany ports and Cherbourg available, the Allied 
forces would complete the build-up necessary to 
liberate France by the autumn of 1944. All of this 
was the basis of Montgomery’s “master plan,” a 
broad concept that proved to have little 
operational significance except that it 
focused attention on Brittany.5
If 21 Army Group could be maintained at 
full strength, there would be ten infantry 
and five armoured divisions available 
to wage war against the German forces 
on the eastern flank. Even with five 
additional armoured brigades available 
to support the infantry divisions, the 
prospects of achieving the force ratios 
necessary to overcome the enemy in this 
vital sector were bleak. The presence 
of three or four German armoured 
divisions and a like number of infantry 
divisions would make it impossible 
to achieve the 3:1 ratio thought to be 
necessary for successful attacks on well-
defended positions. The planners hoped 
to compensate for this weakness by fighting on 
Allied, not German, terms. This meant employing 
the largest possible amount of artillery in the 
bridgehead. Each corps was to be supported 
by an Army Group Royal Artillery (AGRA) with 
4.5- or 5.5-inch medium guns. Air observation 
pilots flying light aircraft were to direct this 
fire, and there were to be abundant allotments 
of ammunition for both the medium and field 
artillery. Fully 18 percent of the men in 21 Army 
Group were gunners; just 15 per cent were to 
be wearing infantry flashes. If the allocation of 
ancillary services is taken into account fully a 
third of the army’s manpower was committed to 
the artillery.6
This approach to war required commanders to 
emphasize logistics, elaborate fire plans, and 
centralized command and control. If shells 
were to be substituted for men’s lives, they had 
to be delivered to the right places at the right 
times. Little attention has been paid to the pre-
Normandy investment in survey regiments, air 
photo interpretation, meteorological reports, 
sound ranging, flash spotting, and other elements 
of the gunner’s war, but these efforts were an 
“It was evident that air power, strategic or tactical, 
had not been the decisive factor in Normandy or 
elsewhere.”
Left: Lancaster heavy bombers of RAF Bomber 
Command attack the Norman village of Villers-
Bocage on 30 June 1944 in an effort to interdict 
roads junctions and forestall a planned German 
offensive that night.
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essential part of the preparations for victory at a 
blood price the Allies could afford. The gunner’s 
war deserves much more attention than it has 
received.7
While the assault divisions prepared for an attack 
on the beaches of the Calvados coast, the divisions 
committed to the follow-up role prepared to 
“attack, wear down and destroy German troops 
who would fight a series of defensive battles on 
ground of their own choosing.”8 There was broad 
agreement on how this was to be accomplished 
and when Lieutenant-General Guy Simonds, 
commander of 2nd Canadian Corps, decided 
to issue a directive on operational policy to 
his inexperienced Canadian divisions he sent 
copies to Lieutenant-General Miles Dempsey, 
the commander of 2nd British Army, and to 
Montgomery, both of whom read it with “complete 
agreement.”9 British senior officers were a bit 
puzzled by the Canadian tendency to prepare 
written papers outlining the obvious but the 
Canadians with their earnest staff officers and 
abundant supply of typewriters, clerk typists and 
duplicating machines produced a written record 
of considerable value to soldiers and historians.
Simonds’ statement of Allied operational doctrine 
called for centralized control of virtually every 
aspect of the battle. The enemy was to be 
overcome by attacks that were “carefully 
organized and strongly supported by all 
available artillery.” The Germans forward 
defences “are not thickly held in terms 
of men, but are strong in automatic 
weapons and well supported by mortars 
sited up to three of four thousand yards” 
behind forward lines. The essence of 
the German system of defence was the 
counterattack, and “as long as fresh 
reserves are available the Germans will 
counterattack continuously, supported 
by self-propelled guns brought up to 
close-range. The success of the offensive 
battle hinged on the defeat of the German 
counterattacks,” and everyone was trained to 
deal with this reality. The preferred solution was 
to stage divisional attacks “on a single thrust 
line, disposed in depth on a one-brigade front.” 
Brigades would be passed through one another 
to maintain momentum, with the frontage 
of the attack “limited to that on which really 
heavy support can be given.” When the enemy 
concentrated its strength across the thrust 
line, a reserve brigade could be “thrown wide 
of the leading brigade” to dissipate the enemy’s 
strength. The weight of artillery support would 
then be shifted to the reserve brigade.
 The infantry division, always and only 
when supported by the artillery, was the “sledge 
hammer” in the Allied arsenal. The armoured 
division was “a weapon of opportunity,” capable 
of dealing with enemy rearguard positions and 
developing a breakout, but it was too weak 
in infantry to carry out an attack in depth. 
Everything experienced in Italy suggested that 
Allied armour could not be used to lead attacks 
against prepared German positions given the 
effective range of their tank and anti tank guns.
 There was no similar doctrine on the tactics 
to be employed in carrying out his “operational 
“Fully 18 percent of the men in 21 Army Group 
were gunners; just 15 per cent were to be 
wearing infantry flashes. If the allocation of 
ancillary services is taken into account fully a 
third of the army’s manpower was committed 
to the artillery.”
Right: The British crew of a 7.2-inch howitzer 
fuse a shell during an action to support the 9th 
Canadian Infantry Brigade in Normandy, 28 
June 1944.
Photo by Ken Bell, Library and Archives Canada (LAC) PA 131413
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policy,” partly because such training was carried 
out in divisional battle schools and partly because 
the operational doctrine left little room for 
traditional platoon or section tactics. By 1944, 
experienced Allied commanders knew that the 
one certain way of defeating the Germans was 
to find, fix, and then neutralize the enemy with 
overwhelming firepower. This would allow the 
infantry to assault and occupy vital ground, 
which the enemy would then counterattack. 
This ‘”bite and hold” doctrine depended on the 
development of centrally controlled, indirect 
artillery fire capable of concentrating the 
guns of a regiment, division, or corps on 
a specific area. This technique provided 
the best possible answer to the enemy’s 
doctrinal commitment to immediate 
and continuous counterattacks and to 
German technical superiority in infantry 
weapons and armoured vehicles.
 An artillery-based battle doctrine required 
the infantry to move forward at a steady 
pace, leaning into the barrage, so as 
to be on the objective before the enemy could 
engage the attackers. Rifle companies, supported 
by tanks, would clear and consolidate, bring 
the anti-tank guns forward, and dig in to meet 
counterattacks from enemy infantry, who would 
be advancing behind tanks or self-propelled 
assault guns. Success depended largely on the 
ability of Forward Observation Officers (FOOs) to 
direct the fire of the field and medium regiments 
at observed targets. This procedure, rehearsed in 
countless exercises, did not require the infantry 
to practise the fire-and-movement skills learned 
“The principal Allied weapon systems, field 
and medium artillery, were rarely able to inflict 
damage on prepared enemy positions and 
were not always able to achieve temporary 
neutralization.”
Left: A 25-pounder field gun of the 49th West 
Riding Division in action in Normandy.
Top: A 5.5-inch gun of the Royal Canadian 
Artillery in action south of Caen, 23 July 1944.
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in battle schools. It did, however, raise questions 
about other aspects of infantry training. These 
issues were widely debated within the army, and 
on 20 April 1944 a four-day conference was held 
at the School of Infantry to exchange ideas and 
information.10
 One of the most contentious questions was 
raised by a staff officer from 2nd British Army, 
who noted that present teaching placed too much 
emphasis on the use of infantry weapons in 
the attack, especially the Bren. Experience had 
shown that the ammunition problem was acute 
in the counterattack phase. Ammunition fired in 
the attack was seldom aimed and was therefore 
wasted. The same officer insisted that though 
the rifleman used his weapon in defending a 
position, in the attack he was “mostly employed 
as an ammunition carrier for the Bren.”
 This realistic view of the impact of operational 
doctrine on tactics directly challenged the 
traditional emphasis on teaching the infantry to 
fight their way forward, with their own weapons, 
by fire and movement. This approach was 
evident in a discussion of the implications of the 
decision that all troops should carry a shovel 
and a pick into battle. Obviously, the additional 
weight would limit the ability of the soldier to 
fight his way forward; yet without entrenching 
tools, no position could be held against enemy 
counterattacks and mortar fire.
 The critics of 21 Army Group’s pre-invasion 
training are quite right when they 
argue that the army’s leadership 
“failed to enforce a coherent 
and effective tactical doctrine.”11 
But was this a weakness or a 
strength? There was agreement 
on operational doctrine, and 
a flexible approach to tactical 
problems encouraged officers to 
seek solutions based on specific 
battlefield conditions, especially 
analysis of the terrain using air 
photographs. A problem-solving 
approach to combat has little 
appeal to military theorists, but it proved to be 
an effective method of dealing with the enemy.
 The discussions at the Infantry School barely 
touched on the role of the armoured regiments 
assigned to work with infantry battalions. 
This was the result of an earlier decision that 
the armoured commander, at the regimental, 
squadron, or troop level, “is the sole arbitrator 
of how he can best employ his resources.” 
This meant that the armoured commander 
decided where to employ his tanks in support 
of an infantry attack, which was itself largely 
determined by the artillery fire plan created at 
division and corps. Although “the primary role” 
of tanks cooperating with infantry was “to close 
with the enemy,” armoured doctrine permitted 
indirect support “on account of the unsuitability 
of the ground” or for other reasons. Armoured 
officers were also reminded that “everyone, and 
particularly the infantry, should understand that 
the tank is designed with the primary object of 
destroying or neutralizing enemy unarmoured 
troops.”12
 Again, it is clear that those who criticize 
the Commonwealth forces for failing to develop 
the kind of integrated tank-infantry battlegroup 
doctrine practiced by the German army are 
correct. The British approach, as it was 
understood in May 1944, allowed everything 
and forbade nothing. It was up to individual 
commanders to develop methods of employing 
their tanks effectively and, as we shall see, they 
did so.
 The Anglo -Canadian 
army that fought the Battle of 
Normandy was well prepared 
for the kind of warfare they 
encountered. The only real 
surprise was the enemy’s 
stubborn, almost mindless, 
persistence in continuing to 
mount counterattacks after it 
was evident that the Allies were 
well prepared to deal with them. 
Willing soldiers led by courageous 
leaders were repeatedly sacrificed 
in obedience to a doctrine that 
the German Army ought to have 
abandoned. In Normandy it was 
Lieutenant-General Guy Simonds’ 
“statement of All ied operational 
doctrine called for centralized control 
of virtually every aspect of the battle.”
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the Allies, not the Germans, who worked out new 
ways of carrying out the intent of their orders.
 This approach to the Normandy battle was 
developed during 20 years of research on the 
Canadian rather than British Army, but the 
Canadians were a small part of a larger force 
so it was necessary to analyse specific British 
operations at corps, divisional and battalion level. 
Canadians have a special interest in the British 
divisions that served in First Canadian Army 
as well as 53rd Welsh and 59th Staffordshire 
Divisions, formations that fought alongside the 
Canadians.
 Let us begin with some comments on the 
performance of 51st Highland Division in 
Normandy. The Highland Division’s record in 
North Africa and Sicily has won universal praise 
but there is near-universal agreement that it 
failed to function effectively in Normandy. I had 
the opportunity to present a contrary view in 
Edinburgh in 1996.13 The audience included 
a number of veterans who had retired holding 
senior rank but who were platoon or company 
commanders in 1944. They were familiar with the 
negative view of the division recently highlighted 
by Carlo D’Este and Max Hastings and curious 
to know what a Canadian might have to say.
 We reviewed the historiography and 
then focused on Montgomery’s much 
quoted letter to Alanbrooke dated 15 
July 1944 in which an exasperated 
Monty wrote,
Regret to report it is considered 
opinion of Crocker, Dempsey and 
myself that 51st Division is at present 
not battle worthy…and had failed in 
every operation it has been given to 
do.14
 Montgomery’s solution was to 
remove Major-General Bullen-Smith and replace 
him with a veteran jock, Tom Rennie. Few of the 
veterans present accepted the idea that Bullen-
Smith had failed and that Rennie transformed 
the division, but there was agreement that getting 
away from Crocker’s I British Corps and being 
given an operational level task – participation 
in Operation Totalize – had a powerful effect on 
morale.
 The orders given to the division in June 
and July required the defence of the vital Orne 
bridgehead coupled with limited battalion-level 
actions to secure additional ground. This was a 
difficult and costly business for anyone, Allied 
or enemy. The discussion than focused on two 
such actions: the battle for Ste. Honorine-le-
Chardonnerette on 23 June and the attempt to 
secure Colombelles on 11 July.
 Ste. Honorine, or what was left of it, had 
been attacked, captured and lost during a 
bloody encounter in mid-June. The village was 
counterattacked by a large force from 21st Panzer 
Division and Bullen-Smith had wisely decided to 
withdraw and allow his artillery to deal with the 
enemy.15 On 23 June, 152nd Brigade (2nd and 
5th Seaforths and 5th Camerons) organized a 
carefully-staged night attack which won them 
complete control of the village.16 The inevitable 
“The Anglo-Canadian army that fought the 
Battle of Normandy was well prepared for 
the kind of warfare they encountered.”
Left: A group of British infantry at work in 
Normandy. They are well equipped for their 
tasks. The soldier of the left carries a Sten 
gun, while the soldier in the centre holds a 
captured German MP 40. He also carries a 
PIAT anti-tank weapon as well as a shovel 
- both items were crucial in dealing with the 
inevitable German counterattacks.
LCMSDS Photograph Collection
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counterattacks began with first light – company 
size battlegroups with tanks and self-propelled 
guns. This time the 13/18 Hussars provided a 
squadron including Firefly 17-pounders and 
the FOOs never lost contact with the field and 
medium artillery. The Cameron’s War Diary17 
contains a detailed account of their part in this 
very successful action which devastated Panzer 
Group Luck, forcing Luck to “rebuild the entire 
formation.”18 This battle, marked by careful 
preparation, limited objectives, close infantry-
tank cooperation and a fire plan designed to 
inflict maximum damage on an enemy whose 
patterned response was easy to prepare for, is one 
of scores of examples of successful brigade-level 
actions in Normandy that need to be studied.
 A different fate awaited 153rd Brigade (5th 
Battalion, The Black Watch; 1st and 5th/7th 
Battalion, The Gordon Highlanders) on the night 
of 10/11 July when Montgomery ordered Crocker 
to stage an attack on Colombelles, an industrial 
suburb of Caen. The object of the action was to 
destroy the tall chimney stacks that provided the 
enemy with an unobstructed view of the Orne 
bridgehead. No detailed account of the battle is 
possible here but since this was the action that 
prompted Montgomery’s letter to Alanbrooke, 
we need to at least note that both division and 
brigade, not to mention the 5th Battalion of the 
Black Watch, who were to carry out the first 
phase of the attack, knew that the Germans 
had reinforced their defences after 
Operation Charnwood forced a 
withdrawal from Caen.19
 The limited fire plan laid on by 
Corps and patrol reports of dug-in 
tanks and anti-tank guns added 
to everyone’s concern. Lieutenant-
Colonel Thompson, the Black Watch 
commanding officer wrote an account 
of the battle which is appended to the 
war diary. He described the efforts to 
dig-in on the first phase objectives 
under constant, accurate mortar and Nebelwerfer 
fire. The news that the 1st Gordons had been 
unable to reach all of their objectives explained 
the heavy fire coming from the battalion’s right 
flank but Brigade promised a new attack would 
begin at first light. Enemy infantry attacks were 
readily repulsed but German armour, including 
at least two Tigers, dealt a devastating blow to 
148 Regiment RAC Shermans destroying 10 of 
their 11 tanks. The available 17-pounders had 
either been blinded by enemy defensive fire 
or destroyed and played no role in the battle. 
Thompson concludes,
I spoke to the Brigadier and told him that to 
hold the positions of my leading companies 
would result in their destruction piecemeal as 
the anti-tank defence had collapsed and my own 
6-pounders could not be brought to bear. He then 
ordered me at about 0800 hours to withdraw to 
St. Honorine and this move was completed under 
continuous smoke by 0930 hours.20
 Bullen-Smith supported this decision 
infuriating Crocker and prompting Montgomery 
to claim that the division “cannot fight the 
Germans successfully.” Montgomery was wrong. 
The Black Watch withdrawal from Colombelles 
was not a failure but a rational response to the 
realities of the battlefield. 
 Men in combat continually engage in cost-
benefit analysis. Orders are ignored, amended 
“The British approach [to tank-infantry co-
operation]…allowed everything and forbade 
nothing. It was up to individual commanders 
to develop methods of employing their tanks 
effectively and, as we shall see, they did so.”
Right: Soldiers from Le Fusilers de Mont-
Royal work with a Canadian Sherman tank 
to hunt snipers in Falaise, 17 August 1944.
LAC PA 131273
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or renegotiated as decision-makers engage in 
calculations of risk versus gain. This reality 
offends senior commanders whose plans are not 
carried out and military historians who seem to 
believe that actions that do not go as planned 
“fail.” But the primary responsibility of the 
commander is to advance the goal of winning the 
war while the historian’s job is to explain what 
happened, not to issue pass/fail grades.
 Ross quickly adapted to this limited role, 
ordering each battalion to thin out their forward 
positions and create large left out of battle 
(LOB) parties. Faced with heavy casualties 
from constant mortar fire. Ross re-organized 
his counter-mortar organization and used his 
heavy mortar platoons to strike enemy locations. 
He also insisted on detailed preparation for 
company-level night raids designed to kill the 
“The evolution of Firefly tactics and the forward 
employment of self-propelled 17-pounder anti-
tank guns all point to an army able to learn from 
experience.”
Below: A Canadian Sherman Firefly, armed with 
a 17-pounder gun, watches over the advance of 
Canadian infantry south of Caen near Ifs, July 
1944.
 The experience of the 53rd Welsh Division has 
attracted little attention and even less is known 
about Major-General R.K. Ross who commanded 
it throughout the war. My interest was sparked 
by the close co-operation between 2nd Canadian 
and 53rd Welsh during the advance to Falaise but 
the divisional war diaries offer other insights into 
other operations in Normandy. The division took 
up positions west of the Orne in early July and 
one of its brigades fought under 15th Scottish 
during the battle for the Evrecy spur but for 
the rest of the month the Welsh Division fought 
a series of battalion-level engagements with 
elements of 10th SS Panzer Division and the 
277nd Infantry Division.
enemy and prevent his own troops from becoming 
browned-off by having to sit in slit trenches, 
being mortared and shelled without retaliation. 
The raids appear to have accomplished their 
primary purpose and to have provoked the kind 
of enemy counterattacks the divisional artillery 
and anti-tank regiments planned and prepared 
for. One such counter-attack on 22 July resulted 
in 10th SS regaining control of the Bon Repas-
Evrecy road a clear victory in a win-lose narrative 
but a typical German defeat in any cost-benefit 
analysis. The Welsh division losses in July (over 
250 killed and close to 2,500 wounded) speak to 
the character of the Normandy battle even when 
no major offensive operations were underway.21
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 Let us turn to the curious case of 49th West 
Riding Division. The 49th was part of First 
Canadian Army for most of the campaign and 
their commitment to the long left flank meant 
that the division experienced prolonged periods 
of limited action. Patrick Delaforce’s recent 
history, The Polar Bears,22 has helped to rescue 
the division from obscurity but many questions 
about the division’s performance in combat 
remain. Brigadier Trevor Hart Dyke, the author 
of one of the very best memoirs of the campaign 
in Northwest Europe, Normandy to Arnhem: a 
Story of the Infantry,23 provided some answers 
in a 1982 interview.
 Brigadier Hart Dyke found the notion of 
German battlefield superiority curious. He had 
read Hastings and D’Este but was quite certain 
that the Hallams and their sister battalions in 
146th Brigade had been consistently effective 
in combat against well-regarded German 
formations. He drew particular attention to the 
success of the Hallams and indeed the brigade 
at Fontenay-le-Pesnel and Tessel Woods. These 
actions, part of 49th Division’s Operation Martlet, 
an attack in support of Epsom, created a three-
kilometre deep penetration in the seam between 
12th SS and Panzer Lehr Divisions.24
 Martlet was designed to accomplish two 
purposes, distraction and attrition. The division 
carried it out with considerable skill. Those who 
insist that the British army never mastered the 
art of infantry-tank co-operation should examine 
the role of the 24th Lancers (8th Armoured 
Brigade) at Tessel Wood. After assisting the 
assault battalions into Fontenay they reformed 
and worked closely with the 1/4th King’s Own 
Yorkshire Light Infantry (KOYLI) employing all 
three squadrons in a close support role. With 
darkness falling, one squadron remained on the 
western edge of the woods to protect the right 
flank and later sent a troop to a threatened sector 
forcing three Panthers to withdraw. The next 
morning the Lancers flushed snipers from the 
hedgerows helping the infantry to consolidate.25 
The later phases of this battle, involving major 
German counterattacks on 70th Brigade’s 
positions at Rauray are described in detail in 
Kevin Baverstock’s superb book Breaking the 
Panzers,26 This account of the Tyneside Scottish 
in action offers a classic account of courage and 
skill in defeating powerful enemy counterattacks. 
It should serve as a model for studies of other 
battles in Normandy and beyond.
 Brigadier Hart Dyke’s comments on battalion 
and brigade level operations prompted a 
discussion of the Hargest Report,27 one of the 
key documents used by authors critical of the 
combat effectiveness of the British soldier. 
His first reaction was to note that Hargest’s 
one reference to a 49th Division battalion, the 
Lincolns, was laudatory. He insisted that there 
were no problems of poor morale in his battalion 
or the brigade and was surprised by the bitter 
tone of Hargest’s comments on the armoured 
regiments which he had thought superb.28 Could 
50th Division’s experience have really been so 
different? Hart Dyke was also puzzled by the New 
Zealander’s stereotype of aggressive self-sufficient 
Dominion soldiers whom he claimed were very 
different than the “hesitant Tommies.” Perhaps 
the report by Brigadier James Hargest, written by 
a brave soldier of the Great War, who had made a 
series of disastrous command decisions in Crete 
before his capture and imprisonment in Italy 
was not an entirely dispassionate document. The 
Hargest Report along with the propaganda on the 
inferiority of Allied soldiers routinely produced 
by German staff officers needs to be examined 
critically as David French began to do in Raising 
Churchill’s Army.29
 If we are to revise the balance sheet on the 
performance of the British army in Normandy. 
A great deal of work needs to be done. When 
Fields of Fire appeared in 2003 an American 
colleague asked, “when will you Canadians stop 
endlessly analyzing your three division army. 
No one else,” he observed, “knows the names 
and personalities of divisional, brigade and even 
battalion commanders. Why don’t you look at the 
larger picture?”
 The answer is that before we can really look 
at the larger picture in 21 Army Group, we need 
studies of the British army at corps, divisional 
and brigade level so that we have a firm basis 
for addressing questions about leadership, 
command, morale, combat motivation and 
combat effectiveness. Those who do study 
the campaign from the ground up will almost 
certainly come to the conclusion that the officers 
and men serving in 21 Army Group demonstrated 
a remarkable ability to apply their doctrine and 
9
Copp: 21st Army Group in Normandy
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2007
74
training to the battlefield. They also demonstrated 
an ability to learn and innovate. The British and 
Canadian response to casualties from mortar fire, 
70 percent of total losses, is a case in point. New 
measures were promptly introduced and a longer 
term initiative to create Counter-Mortar Radar 
Batteries quickly approved.30 The development 
and employment of the Kangaroo armoured 
personal carrier, the Wasp and Crocodile flame-
throwers, the institution of cabrank within the 
tactical air force, the evolution of Firefly tactics 
and the forward employment of self-propelled 
17-pounder anti-tank guns all point to an army 
able to learn from experience. It is time for 
historians to follow their example.
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